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A DRUG BY ANY OTHER NAME ... ?: 





Lars Noah * 
Barbara A. Noah** 
How wonderful that we have met with a paradox. Now we have some hope of 
making progress. 
-Niels Bohr (1885-1962)1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Dietary supplements-vitamins, minerals, herbs, amino acids, and sundry 
other substances-have soared in popularity over the past decade, resulting in a 
$20 billion industry with more· than a thousand manufacturers marketing 
29,000 products.2 A recent survey conducted by the National Center for 
Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) found that approximately 
one-fifth of Americans use supplements.3 These products present vexing 
Professor of Law, University of Florida; served on Institute of Medicine (National 
Academy of Sciences) committee charged with developing a framework for evaluating the 
safety of dietary supplements (July 2001-Jan. 2002). I would like to thank Michael Nardella 
for his research assistance. 
Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College; invited reviewer of a report 
on dietary supplements prepared by the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law 
(2004). 
I. Quoted in L.I. PONOMAREV, THE QUANTUM DICE 75 (A.P. Repieve trans., Inst. of 
Physics Publ'g 1993). 
2. See Justin Gillis, Herbal Remedies Turn Deadly for Patients, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 
2004, at Al ;see also Benedict Carey, When Trust in Doctors Erodes, Other Treatments Fill 
the Void, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at AS; Sally Squires, Pills for Losers: Americans' 
Hunger for Diet-Aid Supplements Outweighs Unknowns, WASH. POST, Dec. 13,2005, at Fl. 
3. See Rob Stein, Alternative Remedies Gaining Popularity, WASH. POST, May 28, 
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regulatory challenges for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and, for 
many years, the agency struggled to formulate an effective regulatory 
approach.4 In 1993, the FDA published a notice that summarized its safety 
concerns associated with various categories of dietary supplements and 
delineated the rather aggressive regulatory recommendations of an agency task 
force. 5 
Congress quickly reacted to these proposed regulatory initiatives. In 1994, 
it enacted the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA),6 which 
sharply limits the FDA's express authority to regulate covered products. 
Congress apparently acted in response to anxious lobbying from the dietary 
supplement industry and the public, both of which were concerned that the 
FDA's notice signaled the agency's intention to overregulate these products.? 
Purporting to balance concerns about the safety of supplements and consumer 
freedom to purchase them, DSHEA's highly deregulatory approach won 
effusive praise from commentators who profess strong faith in the ability of 
laypersons to make intelligent choices about supplement use.8 Other observers 
2004, at Al (describing the results of this government-funded survey of31,000 adults from 
around the country); see also Elizabeth R. Agnvall, You Use That Stuff, Too?, WASH. POST, 
June 29, 2004, at Fl (explaining that Congress provided funding to NCCAM, part of the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), to encourage scientific research into the safety and 
effectiveness of dietary supplements and other alternative and complementary medicines and 
treatments). 
4. See Meghan Colloton, Dietary Supplements: A Challenge Facing the FDA in Mad 
Cow Disease Prevention, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 495, 512-28 (2002) (providing a detailed 
history of the agency's regulatory efforts from 1941 through the enactment of the Dietary 
Supplement Health and Education Act in 1994); Margaret Gilhooley, Herbal Remedies and 
Dietary Supplements: The Boundaries ofDrug Claims and Freedom of Choice, 49 FLA. L. 
REv. 665, 672-79 (1997) (same); Carter Anne McGowan, Note, Learning the Hard Way: L­
Tryptophan, the FDA, and the Regulation of Amino Acids, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 
383 (1994). This Article will focus on current issues and regulatory options at the FDA's 
disposal. 
5. See FDA, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Dietary Supplements, 58 
Fed. Reg. 33,690 (June 18, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. ch. I) (recommending that the 
FDA establish safe levels for use of vitamins and minerals, that it regulate amino acid­
containing dietary supplements as drugs, and that various other types of supplements be 
evaluated under the food additive provisions of the statute in order to determine whether 
they are generally recognized as safe (GRAS)); see also Colloton, supra note 4, at 522-23 
(explaining that this notice focused primarily on the inherent risks of dietary supplements 
rather than on issues surrounding health claims for these products). 
6. Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.). 
7. See Stephen H. McNamara, Dietary Supplements of Botanicals and Other 
Substances, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341, (1995) (explaining that "[m]any members of the 
House of Representatives and Senate stated that they had received more mail, phone calls, 
and constituent pressure on [reducing the regulatory burdens on dietary supplements] than 
on anything else-including health care reform, abortion, or the deficit"). 
8. See, e.g., Michael H. Cohen, U.S. Dietary Supplement Regulation: Belief Systems 
and Legal Rules, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 3, 21 (2000) ("Ideally, one would hope that ... 
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remain dubious, however, that the typical consumer will exercise informed 
skepticism when it comes to claims about the safety and utility of these 
products.9 
Several commentators have tackled issues relating to misleading 
promotional statements, unsubstantiated health claims, potency, contamination 
and other manufacturing problems, and regulatory classification (namely, when 
does a supplement cross the line and become a drug for regulatory 
purposes?). \0 This Article focuses instead on a couple of curious paradoxes that 
may prove useful in the risk regulation of dietary supplements that otherwise 
fully comply with OSHEA's requirements for manufacturing and labeling. 
Although several observers have called for reform or repeal of OSHEA, and 
the FDA often has lamented its lack of meaningful authority over dietary 
supplements, II this Article suggests that the agency actually possesses the 
the body politic would be seen as a holographic collection of autonomous, responsible 
beings, intelligently engaged in the individual pursuit of well-being, rather than as a 
ravenous, gullible and unpredictable horde prey to mesmerizing pill-pushers."); Joshua H. 
Beisler, Note, Dietary Supplements and Their Discontents: FDA Regulation and the Dietary 
Supplement Health and Education Act oj1994,31 RUTGERS L.J. 511 (2000). 
9. See, e.g., Margaret Gilhooley, Deregulation and the Administrative Role: Looking at 
Dietary Supplements, 62 MONT. L. REv. 85, 101-02 (2001) (describing and discussing 
authorized structure-or-function claims on dietary supplement labels that "are beyond the 
consumer's ability to assess" and that "relate to important physical functions"); Charles A 
Morris & Jerry Avom, Internet Marketing oj Herbal Products, 290 JAMA 1505, 1505 
(2003) (analyzing websites relating to eight popular herbal supplements, and concluding that 
consumers "may be misled by vendors' claims that herbal products can treat, prevent, 
diagnose, or cure specific diseases, despite regulations prohibiting such statements"); see 
also Peter J. Cohen, Science, Politics, and the Regulation ojDietary Supplements: It's Time 
to Repeal DSHEA, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 175 (2005); Bruce A Silverglade, Regulating 
Dietary Supplement SaJety Under the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act: Brave 
New World or Pyrrhic Victory?, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 319, 319-20 (1996) (criticizing the 
legislation for purporting to protect consumers' right to purchase supplements despite the 
fact that there was never any risk that such products, as a group, would be removed from the 
market). 
10. See, e.g., Laura AW. Khatcheressian, Regulation oj Dietary Supplements: Five 
Years ojDSHEA, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 623 (1999) (discussing a variety of these issues); 
Iona N. Kaiser, Comment, Dietary Supplements: Can the Law Control the Hype?, 37 Hous. 
L. REv. 1249 (2000); Lauren J. Sloane, Note, Herbal Garden oj Good and Evil: The 
Ongoing Struggles oj Dietary Supplement Regulation, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 323, 335-36 
(1999) (opining that the FDA "possesses almost no regulatory control over" dietary 
supplements such as St. John's Wort and DHEA). 
II. See, e.g., Gilhooley, supra note 4, at 667 (explaining that observers viewed the 
enactment of this statute as one of then FDA Commissioner David Kessler's greatest 
failures, and noting that Dr. Kessler himself believed that dietary supplements presented an 
insoluble regulatory problem); see also Michael Sachs, Comment, Ephedra and the Failure 
oj Dietary Supplement Regulation, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 661, 682-701 (2005); John 
Schwartz, FDA Proposes to Curb RisksJrom Herbal Stimulant, WASH. POST, June 3, 1997, 
at A2 (quoting a prominent consumer advocate who believes that DSHEA has "tied the 
agency's hands" and that the law "forces FDA to wait 'til there's blood on the tracks before 
the agency can act"); cf Rob Stein, FDA Moves on Dietary Supplements, WASH. POST, Mar. 
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regulatory muscle to adopt a more aggressive risk identification and risk 
management strategy within the confines of DSHEA, and that it need not ask 
Congress to amend the statute. 
II. REGULATORY PARADOXES 
In order to understand the possibilities and limitations of DSHEA with 
respect to dietary supplement risk regulation, one must first consider the larger 
context in which the statute operates. The FDA supervises a wide range of 
products, including basic food stuffs, items that deliver more than a simple 
caloric effect (such as caffeinated beverages), products thought to have a quasi­
therapeutic effect (such as dietary supplements), and carefully designed and 
processed substances that are offered solely for therapeutic purposes (such as 
prescription and over-the-counter drugs). In drafting DSHEA, Congress chose 
not to create an entirely new category of products subject to agency controls; 
instead, it defined dietary supplements as a subcategory of food. 12 
In choosing to characterize supplements in this way, Congress explicitly 
rejected past FDA efforts to treat these products as drugs or food additives 
under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Prior to the 
enactment of DSHEA, the agency had attempted to use the food additive 
preapproval requirement as one means to regulate certain dietary 
supplements. 13 DSHEA explicitly exempts these products from regulation as 
8, 2003, at Al (quoting then FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan: "We are doing 
everything we can within the law to make sure Americans get accurately labeled and safe 
dietary supplements."). 
12. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (2000) (requiring that the products be labeled as "dietary 
supplements" and are "not represented for use as a conventional food or as a sole item of a 
meal or the diet"). In contrast, other countries have chosen to create an intermediate, drug­
like category for dietary supplements that permits some direct regulation of their sale. See 
Gilhooley, supra note 4, at 710-11 (describing the German system, which permits 
therapeutic claims for herbal products after review and approval by an independent 
commission that evaluates relevant literature, experimental studies, or "well documented 
knowledge on traditional use"). 
13. See Dietary Supplement Coal., Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting as unripe a challenge to the FDA's charges that CoQI0 qualified as a food 
additive); Gilhooley, supra note 4, at 701; McNamara, supra note 7, at 343 n.7 (citing 
FDA's Compliance Policy Guide, Botanical Products for Use as Food, No. 7117.04). The 
FDA later withdrew this guideline document without comment. See FDA, Dietary 
Supplements: Notice of Withdrawal of Regulatory Guidance, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,597 (1995). 
Some courts expressed skepticism, however, about the FDA's authority to treat supplements 
as food additives because the products in qu~stion contained only one food ingredient and 
therefore could be considered a "food" but not a "food additive." See United States v. 29 
Cartons ... Oakmont Inv. Co., 987 F.2d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Since it defies common 
sense to say tpat a substance can be a 'food additive' when there is no (other) food to which 
it is added, we think the FDA's reading of the Act is nonsensical, and, hence, must be 
incorrect."); United States v. Two Plastic Drums ... Black Current Oil, 984 F.2d 814, 819 
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food additives and, thus, from premarket approval requirements. 14 Congress 
also opted against treating dietary supplements as drugs. IS In contrast to the 
regulatory scheme governing new drugs, which requires substantial premarket 
evaluation of safety and efficacy before the granting of a license,16 DSHEA 
allows dietary supplement manufacturers to market their products without 
receiving any advance clearance from the FDA.17 
(7th Cir. 1993). 
14. See 21 U.S.c. § 321(s)(6). The FDCA subjects food additives to premarket review 
in order to determine whether such substances are safe for use. See id. § 348(a)-(c). The 
FDA has, however, exempted from premarket approval requirements these substances added 
to food that are "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS). See 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(a) (2005); 
see also Lars Noah & Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing the Food 
Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U. L. REv. 329, 349-64, 377-81 (1998). 
IS. The FDCA defines a "drug" as "articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man" and "articles (other than food) 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man." 21 U.S.C. § 
321(g)(1)(B)-(C). The definitional provisions added by DSHEA specifically exempt foods 
and dietary supplements from regulation as drugs, even if their labeling contains certain 
types of health claims. See id. § 321(g)(1)(D). Congress instead could have opted to classify 
dietary supplements as drugs, exempt them from new drug approval requirements, and then 
modify the otherwise applicable risk-benefit safety standard for drugs. 
16. See id. § 355 (requiring premarket review for new drugs); see also Richard A. 
Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation ofMedical Products, 82 VA. L. REv. 
1753, 1761-76 (1996) (providing a detailed discussion of how the current new drug approval 
process evolved from earlier approaches). 
17. A company wishing to sell a supplement containing a "new dietary ingredient" 
(defined as one not marketed before October 15, 1994) must, however, file a notification 
with the FDA at least seventy-five days prior to market introduction, which provides the 
basis for the manufacturer's conclusion that the supplement will "reasonably be expected to 
be safe" and must demonstrate only that "[t]here is a history of use or other evidence of 
safety." 21 U.S.C. § 350b(a)(2); see also Scott Bass & Emily Marden, The New Dietary 
Ingredient Safety Provision of DSHEA: A Return to Congressional Intent, 31 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 285 (2005). Even so, if the agency finds the notification inadequate, it can prevent 
marketing only by initiating formal enforcement proceedings. The FDA recently issued 
warning letters requesting that the manufacturers of supplements containing 
androstenedione, an anabolic steroid precursor that functions like a steroid once it is 
metabolized in the body, withdraw their products from the market because they contain a 
new dietary ingredient for which there is no evidence of safe use. See Press Release, Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs., HHS Launches Crackdown on Products Containing Andro: FDA 
Warns Manufacturers to Stop Distributing Such Products (Mar. 11, 2004), available at 
http://www.fda.govlbbs/topics/news/2004 [hereinafter Andro Press Release]. The FDA 
argued that, because products containing androstenedione were adulterated, it is cooperating 
with efforts to enact legislation that would recategorize andro-containing products as 
controlled substances, thereby enabling the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to 
regulate them as anabolic steroids under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), Pub. L. No. 
91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.c.); cf Lars Noah, 
Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 55 (2003) (elaborating on the different roles played by these two agencies under the 
CSA); Amy Shipley, Steroids Detected in Dietary Tablets, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2005, at 
El (explaining that anabolic steroids cannot be sold as dietary supplements). The FDA's 
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OSHEA also permits manufacturers to include so-called "structure or 
function" claims in their product labeling, so long as the manufacturer "has 
substantiation that such statement is truthful and not misleading,"18 but it does 
not require preclearance of these claims by the agency.19 In contrast, such 
structure-or-function claims in the labeling of a product not covered by 
OSHEA would render it a new drug requiring FDA approvaPo If dietary 
attempt to recharacterize andro as a controlled substance illustrates the lengths to which the 
agency will go in order to extend its regulatory authority over supplement products. 
18. See 21 U.S.c. § 343(r)(6)(B). Neither the statute nor its legislative history 
elaborates on the type or quantity of evidence that is sufficient to provide such 
substantiation. The FDA recently requested comments on a draft guidance document dealing 
with the type and quality of evidence that a manufacturer should have in order to 
substantiate a structure-or-function claim under this section of the statute. See infra notes 45­
49 and accompanying text. 
19. See id. § 343(r)(6)(C). In part, DSHEA grew out of the FDA's initial resistance to 
approving any health claims for dietary supplements as authorized by the Nutrition Labeling 
and Education Act (NLEA), Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of21 U.s.C.); see also Diedtra Henderson, It's Goodfor You, 
But . .. : FDA's Ruling on Qualified Health Claims for Tomatoes Confuses Buyers, Critics 
Say, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 2005, at Dl (reporting complaints that the agency continues 
to treat supplements more restrictively in this sense). The NLEA refers to such claims as 
"statements of nutritional support." See 21 C.F.R. § 101.13-.14 (2005) (implementing the 
statutory provision). The NLEA's standards for permitted statements of nutritional support, 
at least as applied by the FDA, are quite rigorous. See Mara A. Michaels, Comment, FDA 
Regulation of Health Claims Under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990: A 
Proposal for a Less Restrictive Scientific Standard, 44 EMORY L.J. 319 (1995). DSHEA 
authorized supplement manufacturers to make disease-related claims for "classical nutrient 
deficiency disease" (for example, that calcium prevents osteoporosis). See 21 U.S.C. § 
343(r)(6)(A); see also Margaret Gilhooley, The Impact and Limits of the Constitutional 
Deregulation of Health Claims on Foods and Supplements: From Dementia to Nuts to 
Chocolate to Saw Palmetto, 56 MERCER L. REv. 683, 689-94 (2005) (discussing subsequent 
litigation that forced the FDA to liberalize its standards). See generally Lars Noah, What's 
Wrong with "Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law"?, 75 TUL. L. REv. 137 (2000). 
20. See 21 U.S.c. § 321(g)(C) ("The term 'drug' means ... articles (other than food) 
intended to affect the structure or function of the body of man ...."); see also FDA, 
STRUCruREIFUNCTION CLAIMS; SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE, available at 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/sclmguid.htrnl (providing examples of permissible claims 
and advice about divining the difference between structure-or-function claims and 
impermissible disease claims). Thus, even after DSHEA, dietary supplements making 
explicit or implicit therapeutic claims face regulation as drugs under the FDCA. See, e.g., 
United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 547 (D.N.J. 2004); United States v. 
Ten Cartons ... Ener-B Nasal Gel, 888 F. Supp. 381,391,390-98 (E.D.N.Y.) (sustaining the 
FDA's claim that a vitamin supplement sold in a noningestible form was an unapproved new 
drug rather than either a food or a dietary supplement: "Although vitamin B-12 may 
commonly be used as a food, gels containing vitamin B-12 that are administered through the 
nose hardly meet the every day definition of food."), ajJ'd, 72 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 1995) (per 
curiam). For example, in 2003, the agency initiated regulatory action against the 
manufacturer of Coral Calcium Supreme, which was advertised as a cure for colon cancer, 
mUltiple sclerosis, heart disease, and lupus. See Melissa Healy, Coral Calcium Scrutinized: 
Regulators Say Some Supplement Sellers Make Outrageous Claims About Its Benefits, L.A. 
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supplement manufacturers wish to include permitted structure-or-function 
claims on their product labels, they need only add a disclaimer that the product 
has not been evaluated by the FDA and that the "product is not intended to 
diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any disease."21 The subtleties of these 
distinctions, however, may be lost on many consumers of supplement products. 
Because people of all ages and varying health routinely ingest food 
products in fairly large quantities, the FDA is appropriately intolerant of any 
sort of risk. The FDCA adopted a remarkably stringent safety standard for 
foods: such a product is considered adulterated under the Act if it "bears or 
contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious 
to health."22 In contrast, consumers typically ingest drugs for only a short 
duration, in limited quantities, and for a specific purpose, and many of these 
drugs are prescribed by a medical professional who takes into account the 
health of the individual. For these reasons, the regulatory approach to drug 
products inevitably tolerates a certain amount of risk in exchange for expected 
benefits, and the statutory process for assessing the safety of these products 
explicitly contemplates a risk-benefit calculus. Because many consumers ingest 
dietary supplements chronically, in high doses, and with the hope of obtaining 
a therapeutic benefit, the lack of premarket safety and efficacy evaluation or 
any professional supervision in the use of these products is very troubling. 
The safety thresholds for foods and dietary supplements are not, however, 
identical. Although DSHEA treats supplements as a category of food, Congress 
went further in protecting dietary supplement manufacturers from adulteration 
charges. In an enforcement proceeding alleging that a dietary supplement is 
adulterated, the agency shoulders the burden of proving that it "presents a 
significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury under conditions 
recommended or suggested in the labeling" or that it poses "an imminent 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at Fl (observing that, although the manufacturer was forced to stop 
airing its infomercials, the product continued to be available on the market pending a judicial 
challenge). 
21. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C). For example, a bottle ofSt. John's Wort may contain 
a structure-or-function claim such as "promotes mental well-being," but it may not claim 
that the product is effective in alleviating the symptoms of clinical depression. A label on a 
bottle of Saw Palmetto extract may state that the product "promotes prostate health," but it 
may not claim that it treats the symptoms of benign prostatic hyperplasia. See FDA, Letter to 
Jonathan W. Emord, Dietary Supplement Claim for Saw Palmetto Extract and Benign 
Prostatic Hyperplasia: Denied, May 26, 2000, available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/ 
-dms/dspltrOl.html. Finally, DSHEA also requires that manufacturers list the name and 
quantity of each ingredient contained in the product, including nutrition information for any 
ingredients for which the government has established a recommended daily amount of 
consumption. See 21 U.S.c. § 343(s). 
22. 21 U.S.c. § 342(a). The statute qualifies this standard slightly by adding "but in 
case the substance is not an added substance such food shall not be considered 
adulterated ... if the quantity of such substance ... does not ordinarily render it injurious to 
health." Id. 
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hazard to public health or safety."23 The FDA's burden is further complicated 
by the fact that the statute does not mandate manufacturer adverse event 
reporting, and, notwithstanding calls to add such a requirement, it seems 
unlikely that this will happen anytime soon.24 As a consequence, the FDA 
receives information about less than one percent of supplement-related 
problems.25 It must rely on consumer complaints, information in published 
clinical studies, or physician reports through the MedWatch Medical Products 
Reporting System.26 Taken together, these sources fail to provide the agency 
with accurate or timely information about patterns of risk associated with 
dietary supplements.27 
23. [d. § 342(f)(1)(A), (C). 
24. See Tracy Hampton, More Scrutiny for Dietary Supplements?, 293 JAMA 27, 28 
(2005) (noting that a bipartisan group of senators have introduced a bill to mandate adverse 
event reporting, and explaining that a consumer advocacy group has urged the FDA to "go to 
Congress and tell them that it wants to have [this] authority"). This stands in contrast to 
adverse event reporting requirements for prescription drugs. See 21 U.S.c. § 355(k)(1); 21 
C.F.R. § 314.80 (2005). Based on the apparent gravity of the risk, the FDA may issue a 
medical alert to health professionals, require labeling changes to reflect new information, 
require boxed warnings in labeling to emphasize particularly important new risk 
information, or demand that the product be withdrawn from the market altogether. 
25. See HHS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ADVERSE EVENT REpORTING FOR DIETARY 
SUPPLEMENTS: AN INADEQUATE SAFETY VALVE 5 (2001) [hereinafter Supplement Adverse 
Events]; see also FDA, Final Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine 
Alkaloids Adulterated Because They Present an Unreasonable Risk, 69 Fed. Reg. 6788, 
6832-34 (2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 119) (describing the process for evaluating 
adverse events associated with ephedra-containing supplements, and noting that the FDA has 
calculated that only ten percent of adverse events associated with ephedrine alkaloids are 
reported); id. at 6814-18 (discussing difficulties in validating dietary supplement reports); 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: UNCERTAINTIES IN ANALYSES 
UNDERLYING FDA's PROPOSED RULE ON EPHEDRINE ALKALOIDS, GGD-99-99-90, at 9-11 
(1999) [hereinafter GAO EPHEDRINE REpORT] (describing a wide array of informational gaps 
and inconsistencies in the over 800 adverse event reports received by FDA dealing with 
ephedrine alkaloid containing products, and observing that these data flaws make it 
scientifically difficult to demonstrate a causal effect between the ingestion of ephedra 
products and adverse reactions or to extrapolate trends in adverse effects by dose and 
duration of usage). Moreover, because DSHEA does not require manufacturers to register 
with the FDA or to submit samples of marketed products, the agency may have difficulty 
investigating reports of adverse events associated with dietary supplements. See HHS, 
Supplement Adverse Events, supra, at 12-13. 
26. MedWatch provides a simple, one-page form for physicians and other health 
professionals to use in reporting serious aqverse reactions associated with drugs, dietary 
supplements, and other regulated products. See FDA, MEDWATCH, MEDICAL PRODUCT 
SAFETY INFORMATION, http://www.fda.gov/medwatchlsafety.htrn (providing safety alert 
information gleaned from MedWatchreports for dietary supplements and other types of 
FDA-regulated products). 
27. See Adriane Fugh-Berman, Herb-Drug Interaction, 355 LANCET 134 (2000) 
(describing concerns about the difficulty of tracking herb-drug interactions); James D. Lewis 
& Brian L. Strom, Balancing Safety of Dietary Supplements with the Free Market, 136 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 616, 617 (2002) (observing that, because MedWatch relies on 
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The biggest challenge to the FDA centers around the as-yet-unidentified 
risks associated with dietary supplement products that are manufactured 
properly, labeled accurately, not contaminated, and for which the seller has 
some proof to support a permitted structure-or-function claim. For ease of 
discussion, this Article will refer to such products as "conforming dietary 
supplements." Although commentators have suggested that OSHEA forces the 
FDA to wait for evidence that a product has caused actual harm to 
individuals,28 the agency can, in fact, identify risky products before they cause 
substantial public harm. The remainder of this Article will discuss some 
oddities in the existing statutory scheme and will explore a regulatory strategy 
that could enable the agency to identify and respond more efficiently to 
growing safety concerns with respect to conforming dietary supplements, 
without waiting for an accumulation of serious adverse event reports. 
A. The Risk Identification Paradox 
The broad category of dietary supplements includes various types of 
ingredients that lie on a continuum of risk.29 Daily multivitamin supplements 
pose relatively little risk; when taken in amounts that do not exceed 
recommended daily allowances, these products provide an effective means to 
augment nutrient intake with no apparent adverse effects.30 At the other 
voluntary physician reporting, which in turn requires patients or health care providers to 
recognize an adverse event as possibly related to a supplement product, most adverse events 
associated with dietary supplements probably go unreported, and advocating the 
implementation of additional postmarketing safety systems for both drugs and dietary 
supplements). 
28. See Marcia Angell & Jerome P. Kassirer, Editorial, Alternative Medicine: The 
Risks ofUntested and Unregulated Remedies, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 839, 840 (1998) ("The 
FDA can intervene only after the fact, when it is shown that a product is harmfui."); Jane E. 
Brody, Alternative Medicine Makes Inroads, but Watch outfor Curves, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 
1998, at F7 ("To make matters worse, the [FDA], which cannot require premarket clearance 
based on tests of safety and effectiveness for any dietary supplement, can act against a 
product only after a disaster."). 
29. See Phil B. Fontanarosa et ai., The Need for Regulation ofDietary Supplements­
Lessons from Ephedra, 289 JAMA 1568, 1570 (2003) (observing that dietary supplement 
products have proliferated dramatically in the decade since the passage of DSHEA, and 
recommending that "[e]ach class of products within dietary supplements should be re­
examined, and the types of products within each class should be reviewed and classified 
according to possible biological action, purported benefit, and potential risks"). 
30. See FDA, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Dietary Supplements, 58 
Fed. Reg. 33,690, 33,692 (June 18, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. ch. I) (explaining that 
the "broad spectrum of dietary supplement products present a range of safety and labeling 
issues" and that "vitamins and essential minerals taken in moderate potencies present few 
safety concerns"). One recent study also suggests that multivitamins effectively delay the 
progression of HIV disease in infected women. See Wafaie W. Fawzi et ai., A Randomized 
Trial ofMultivitamin Supplements and HIV Disease Progression and Mortality, 351 NEW 
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extreme, products containing ephedra, kava, and L-tryptophan, for example, 
may present serious risks to otherwise healthy users even when ingested in 
recommended amounts. 31 
Scientists have long recognized that any foreign substance-a 
"xenobiotic"-introduced into the body increases the risk that the individual 
will experience harmful effects.32 With the exception of most vitamins, 
minerals, and amino acids, dietary supplements represent a category of 
xenobiotics. Moreover, to the extent that they promote or alter biological 
actlVlty within the body, dietary supplements may qualify as 
pharmacologically-active substances.33 When individuals consume such 
supplements, they risk suffering adverse effects. Ample evidence of adverse 
effects associated with a wide variety of dietary supplements bears out the 
connection between pharmacological activity and risk of adverse events,34 and, 
ENG. J. MED. 23, 26-28 (2004) (concluding that multivitamin supplementation improved 
CD4+ and CD8+ cell counts and reduced viral load, allowing patients to delay the 
commencement of antiretroviral therapy, but finding that vitamin A supplementation alone 
provided little benefit). Megadoses, however, may fail to deliver on promised benefits and 
pose health risks to boot. See Stephen Smith, The Vitamin Paradox: Nutrients in Food Are 
Healthier Than Those in Pills, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1,2005, at Cl. 
31. See Peter A.G.M. De Smet, Herbal Remedies, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2046, 2047­
48 (2002) (describing adverse effects and toxicity problems associated with a variety of 
herbal supplements). 
32. See DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (29th ed. 2000) (defining "xenobiotic" as "a 
chemical foreign to the biologic system"). Moreover, adverse reactions to foreign substances 
tend to be unpredictable. See John A. Anderson, Allergic Reactions to Drugs and Biological 
Agents, 268 JAMA 2845 (1992). Of course, individuals may suffer idiosyncratic reactions to 
common foods such as peanuts. Moreover, certain foodstuffs may trigger biological activity 
by virtue of natural chemicals that some plants and animals produce to ward off predators. 
See Denise Grady, Not for the Faint of Mouth: Why Garlic Packs Such a Wallop, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 16,2005, at Fl; Christina S.N. Lewis, Indian Spice May Ward Off Disease, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2005, at D5 (reporting on research with curcumin, the active 
ingredient in tunneric). A century ago, after all, researchers derived aspirin from the bark of 
willow trees, and many modem drugs originate in nature, though they are not typically 
derived from items found in normal diets. 
33. See Fontanarosa et al., supra note 29, at 1569 (describing the biological impact of 
various supplements, including: ephedra alkaloids, which affect the cardiovascular system; 
saw palmetto, which suppresses tissue levels of dihydrotestosterone in men and alters the 
DNA structure in certain types of prostate cells; and yohimbine, which is promoted to 
enhance male sexual function and affects the nervous system, by increasing heart rate, blood 
pressure, and motor activity); Donald M. Marcus & Arthur P. GroHman, Botanical 
Medicines-The Need for New Regulations, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2073, 2073 (2002) 
("[B]otanicals are complex mixtures of chemicals described by [others] as 'crude drugs of 
vegetable origin,' many of which are potentially toxic."); see also FDA, Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking on Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. at 33,690, 33,695-99 
(describing various pharmacologically-active dietary supplements, including certain amino 
acids that function as precursors for neurotransmitters, and hormones and botanical products 
such as yohimbine, which causes vasodilation). 
34. See, e.g., Richard S. Finkel & Karen M. Zarlengo, Blue Cohosh and Perinatal 
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the more pharmacologically active a supplement is, the greater the risk of 
adverse effects associated with its ingestion.35 In fact, the first stage of clinical 
trials of new drugs involves dose-ranging studies using healthy volunteers to 
determine how the body metabolizes the drug substance and what doses it can 
tolerate.36 
The FDA can work within the confines of OSHEA to anticipate and 
manage dietary supplement risks. Indeed, substantiated structure-or-function 
claims for a particular supplement should trigger regulatory concern precisely 
because demonstrable pharmacological activity indicates that the product may 
pose risks as well as benefits. In other words, the very fact that a given dietary 
supplement product "does" something other than simply supply nutrients or 
calories indicates the potential for associated risk. 37 
Stroke, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 302, 302-03 (2004) (describing a case of an infant who 
experienced a stroke shortly after birth as a result of her mother's ingestion of a tea 
(recommended by the mother's obstetrician as a means to induce labor) made from blue 
cohosh, an herb known to cause uterine contraction and artery constriction in rats); Christine 
A. Haller & Neal L. Benowitz, Adverse Cardiovascular and Central Nervous System Events 
Associated with Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedra Alkaloids, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1833, 1834-36 (2000) (describing and discussing numerous cases of cardiovascular and 
nervous system effects associated with ephedra use); Marc Kaufman, FDA Seeks to Halt 
Sales of Supplement: Agency Warns Distributors as It Reports Andro Poses Long-Term 
Health Risk, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2004, at A3 (reporting adverse effects, including liver 
disease, changes in blood coagulation, and increased risk of breast and endometrial cancer in 
women, associated with the use of androstenedione, a synthetic precursor to an anabolic 
steroid). 
35. Courts addressing products liability claims for prescription drugs have 
acknowledged this point. See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 391 (2d Cir. 
1998) ("The reason the FDA does not approve the prescription of new drugs at above the 
dosages as to which extensive tests have been performed is because all drugs involve risks of 
untoward side effects. . .. [T]he higher the dosage the greater is the likelihood of such 
negative effects."); Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991) ("Because 
prescription drugs are chemical compounds designed to interact with the chemical and 
physiological processes of the human body, they will almost always pose some risk of side 
effects in certain individuals."). 
36. See LARS NOAH & BARBARA A. NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS 145-46 (2002) (describing phases of preapproval 
clinical drug testing). 
37. See Fontanarosa et aI., supra note 29, at 1569 ("If dietary supplements have or 
promote such biological activity, they should be considered active drugs."); Jennifer J. 
Spokes, Note, Confusion in Dietary Supplement Regulation: The Sports Products Irony, 77 
B.U. L. REv. 181 (1997); cf 21 C.F.R. § 21O.3(b)(7) (defining "active ingredient" as "any 
component that is intended to furnish pharmacological activity or other direct [drug] 
effect"). It is important to note, however, that certain dietary supplements can pose risks 
even in the absence of pharmacological activity. For example, "starch blocker" and guar 
gum products promoted for weight loss do not depend on metabolism in the body to achieve 
their physiological effect, but they may present a risk of esophageal blockage, and, before 
DSHEA, the FDA successfully regulated these products as unapproved new drugs. See Am. 
Health Prods. Co. v. Hayes, 744 F.2d 912, 913 (2d Cir. 1984); Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 
713 F.2d 335, 338-39 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Undetermined Quantities of "Cal-Ban 
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The statutory definition of "drug" centers around intended use rather than 
on the mere fact of pharmacological activity.38 Nevertheless, the FDA need not 
make the argument that a particular supplement's intended use renders it a drug 
(and therefore an unapproved new drug) under the FDCA. For risk 
identification purposes, a supplement's intended use matters far less than its 
inherent degree of pharmacological activity, which provides a tip-off that a 
particular product may pose risks because anything that affects the body 
systemically can trigger adverse events. In a similar vein, nearly exclusive 
therapeutic use of a product also can trigger drug status.39 The agency need not 
focus, however, on the question of whether increasing therapeutic use of a 
particular dietary supplement enables the agency to regulate the product as a 
drug. Instead, it should view widespread therapeutic use as signaling the 
possibility of inherent pharmacological activity and associated hazards. 
Whenever supplement manufacturers market their products as possessing 
beneficial, drug-like qualities, this should raise a cascade of safety concerns 
3000," 776 F. Supp. 249, 253-55 (E.D.N.C. 1991). In contrast, true foods can make health 
claims when they simply provide a necessary nutrient rather than produce some 
pharmacological activity within the body. 
38. See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784 
(1969); United States v. Loran Med. Sys., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
See generally NOAH & NOAH, supra note 36, at 6-50 (discussing product categories, intended 
use, and the various factors driving the FDA's regulatory approach); Jay M. Zitter, 
Annotation, What Is "Drug" Within Meaning of § 201(g)(l) of Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 127 A.L.R. FED. 141 (l995 & 2005 Supp.). Even so, the FDA occasionally 
has argued that a component of a supplement product is inherently a drug. See, e.g., 
Pharmanex v. Shalala, 221 F.3d 1151 (lOth Cir. 2000) (sustaining the FDA's determination 
that Cholestin, a product derived from red yeast rice and intended to promote healthy 
cholesterol levels, was an unapproved new drug because it contained a natural substance that 
was chemically identical to the active ingredient lovastatin in a cholesterol-lowering 
prescription drug). 
39. See, e.g., Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1977). 
In this case, the court examined the regulatory status of high-dose vitamins A and D to 
determine whether the FDA could regulate these products as drugs. The court concluded that 
lack of nutritional utility above the recommended daily allowance (RDA) levels and 
associated toxicity was not a sufficient basis on which to conclude that the sellers of the 
high-dose vitamins intended a therapeutic use, and the fact that persons other than the sellers 
made therapeutic claims about high-dose vitamins was not sufficient to trigger drug status 
unless the FDA could demonstrate nearly exclusive use as a drug. See id. at 336-37. Recent 
developments in tobacco litigation may have impacted the continuing authoritativeness of 
this dictum. The FDA took the position that a seller's subjective but uncommunicated intent 
could establish the necessary intended use, and a federal district court accepted that 
argument; the Supreme Court explicitly left open this question when it decided to invalidate 
the district court's decision on other grounds. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131-32 (2000); see also Richard M. Cooper, The WLF Case Thus Far, 
55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 477, 485-86 (2000) (criticizing the FDA's position); Lars Noah, 
Regulating Cigarettes: (Non)sense and Sensibility, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 677, 678-79 (1998) 
(discussing this litigation, and identifying flaws in the FDA's position). 
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with the FDA.40 The fact that certain supplements actually may work 
therapeutically to reduce hot flashes, improve erectile function, relieve arthritic 
joints, or fight depression-rather than just as a general means to improve 
nutrition-presents a frightening proposition because these products are sold 
with no premarket safety evaluation and virtually no regulatory oversight.41 
This is the first paradox: while wholly inert supplement products may 
perpetrate an economic fraud on consumers because they provide no benefit in 
exchange for the purchase price, the most worrisome products are those 
supplements that actually work exactly as promised. 
Certain dietary supplements may possess tremendous untapped potential to 
treat or prevent disease in humans, but the lack of rigorous scientific study of 
these products leaves consumers and health care providers in the dark about 
which products are safe and effective for which purposes. Sellers of dietary 
supplements frequently base claims of efficacy on anecdotal experience rather 
than controlled clinical trials.42 Even in cases where research demonstrates a 
40. A recent trend in dietary supplement advertising further reinforces the concern that 
dietary supplement manufacturers are promoting their products as possessing drug-like 
qualities, and that consumers cannot tell the difference between supplements and drugs. 
Supplement manufacturers frequently package their products in ways that resemble drug 
packaging (for example, a twenty-eight-day cycle pack of an herbal supplement intended to 
increase sexual satisfaction for women looks very much like a cycle pack of oral 
contraceptive pills), and many advertisements now tout these products as "available without 
a prescription," misleadingly implying that they once were prescription drugs. See, e.g., 
Altovis Once Daily Tablet to Fight Fatigue, http://www.altovis.com (describing the product 
as containing a "proprietary blend" of "green tea leaf extract (provides 100 mg. caffeine), 
cordycepts extract (mycelium), Eleutherococcus senticosuslPanax ginseng standardized 
extracts (root), vinpocetine (from vocanga tree seeds), and octacosanol. These premium 
ingredients work in tandem to help support long-lasting energy, so you can get your day off 
to a great start and feel terrific all day long."). The website also offers customers an 
opportunity to obtain a free "30-day cycle." See id. 
41. See Fontanarosa et a!., supra note 29, at 1569 ("If dietary supplements have or 
promote such biological activity, they should be considered to be active drugs. On the other 
hand, if dietary supplements are claimed to be safe because they lack or have minimal 
biological activity, then their ability to cause physiologic changes to support 
'structure/function claims' should be challenged ...."). Even when the seller of a dietary 
supplement makes a structure-or-function claim permitted under DSHEA, this raises at least 
three distinct possibilities: (l) the claim is entirely false because the product has no effect on 
the body; (2) the claim has some basis in truth because the product does something to the 
body that affects its structure or function in some way that relates to the labeled claim; or (3) 
the supplement affects the body's structure or function but in some way that is unrelated to 
the labeled claim (and possibly very undesirable). 
42. See Angell & Kassirer, supra note 28, at 839-40 ("Many advocates of alternative 
medicine ... believe the scientific method is simply not applicable to their remedies. They 
rely instead on anecdotes and theories."); Franklin G. Miller et a!., Ethical Issues 
Concerning Research in Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 291 JAMA 599, 600-01 
(2004) (criticizing the lack of scientifically rigorous study of dietary supplements, and 
urging that scientists evaluate these products using randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in 
order to generate reliable risk-benefit information); see also Lars Noah, Medicine's 
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supplement's lack of efficacy,43 proponents may continue to insist that the 
weight of accumulated anecdotal evidence supports its usefulness.44 
The FDA recently published a new draft guidance document that 
elaborates on what the agency believes constitutes adequate substantiation for a 
DSHEA-permitted structure-or-function claim. The guidance document 
proposes tracking the standard applied by the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) to dietary supplement (and other) advertising claims,45 which requires 
Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical 
Community, 44 ARIz. L. REv. 373, 382-91 (2002) (distinguishing between anecdotal 
information and scientific evidence from controlled clinical trials, and describing obstacles 
to conducting RCTs that inhibit meaningful technology assessment). To further complicate 
matters, because dietary supplements are so readily available, researchers who wish to 
conduct RCTs to study a supplement's safety and efficacy may find it difficult to enroll test 
subjects. Consider aspirin, the "wonder drug" that has been used in various forms for over 
5,000 years. Scientists continue to evaluate new potential uses for aspirin, but its success and 
ready availability actually inhibit rigorous study of this product. Because so many people 
take aspirin regularly and understand its benefits, researchers find it difficult to recruit 
volunteers to participate in aspirin trials that utilize placebo controls. See Diarmud Jeffreys, 
A Victim of Its Own Success: Aspirin, THE GUARDIAN, June 8, 2004, at S8. Some of these 
same issues arise with respect to research on dietary supplements. Consumers who are 
already convinced of the benefits of these easily available products may express reluctance 
to enroll in well-designed clinical trials to evaluate their safety and efficacy. 
43. See, e.g., Paul R. Solomon et aI., Ginkgo for Memory Enhancement: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 288 JAMA 835, 837-38 (2002) (concluding that ginkgo had no effect on 
performance on neurological memory, attention, naming, or verbal fluency tests in elderly 
adults who suffered from cognitive problems); January W. Payne, The Right Stuff: Rigorous 
Herbal Study Proves Internet's Research Potential, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2005, at F1 
(reporting that clinical trials have found no benefit from kava or valerian in treating anxiety 
or insomnia); Deborah Franklin, Vitamin E Fails to Deliver on Early Promise, N.Y. TiMES, 
Aug. 2, 2005, at F5; Lindsey Tanner, Many Go on Taking Discredited Remedies, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at AS (reporting that recent studies have found no therapeutic value to 
glucosamine, chondroitin, saw palmetto, echinacea, St. John's wort, or shark cartilage). 
44. See Kathleen M. Boozang, Is the Alternative Medicine? Managed Care 
Apparently Thinks So, 32 CONN. L. REv. 567, 602 (2000); see also Elizabeth Agnvall, Joint 
Dispute: Early Results of Arthritis Trial Show Little Benefit for Glucosamine, but the 
Industry Is Already Spinning, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2005, at Fl. On the other hand, when 
critics of dietary supplements offer up anecdotal evidence of risks associated with a product, 
proponents hypocritically demand rigorous clinical studies demonstrating the hazard. 
45. See FDA, Notice of Availability, Dietary Supplements: Strategy for the Further 
Implementation and Enforcement of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 
1994, 69 Fed. Reg. 64,957 (2004). The guidance document proposes that the FDA 
implement a standard that is consistent with the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) standard 
of evidence for dietary supplement advertising claims. That standard requires substantiation 
in the form of "competent and reliable scientific evidence." See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY, SUBSTANTIATION FOR DIETARY SUPPLEMENT CLAIMS MADE UNDER SECTION 
403(r)(6) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (2004), available at 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/dsclmgui.htrnl [hereinafter SUBSTANTIATION GUIDANCE 
DOCUMENT]. 
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substantiation in the form of "competent and reliable scientific evidence."46 
Under this standard, the FDA announced a preference for so-called intervention 
studies, in which an investigator develops a hypothesis to be tested and then 
controls whether the subjects receive the test article in order to determine 
whether the supplement actually works as claimed.47 The agency also 
explained that anecdotal evidence and testimonials provide useful background 
to support a claim but would not ordinarily provide adequate substantiation.48 
Because OSHEA does not require pre-clearance of such claims, however, the 
FDA must resort to post hoc case-by-case enforcement actions against already­
marketed supplements that fail to meet the agency's preferred scientific 
standard for substantiation of structure-or-function claims.49 
Commentators appropriately have lamented the lack of quality research 
data on both the safety and efficacy of these products,50 and dietary supplement 
manufacturers are now rushing to fill the void by attempting to offer scientific 
proof of efficacy.51 Indeed, manufacturers of dietary supplements have 
46. See FDA, SUBSTANTIATION GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 45, at 3-4. See 
generally Lars Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech: Product Labeling Controls and the 
First Amendment, 47 FLA. L. REv. 63,103-04 (1995). 
47. See FDA, SUBSTANTIATION GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 45, at 8-9 
(explaining in the discussion of "intervention studies" that "[r]andomized, double blind, 
parallel group, placebo-controlled trials offer the greatest assessment of a relationship 
between a dietary supplement and an outcome"). 
48. See id. at 9-10. 
49. Of course, the fact that the agency has not formalized its preferences through a 
regulation promulgated under notice-and-comrnent rulemaking but is instead announcing its 
position through a "draft guidance document" raises other complex issues of administrative 
procedure that are beyond the scope of this Article. See Lars Noah, The FDA's New Policy 
on Guidelines: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 113 (1997); cf 
Washington Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1995) (concluding that a First 
Amendment challenge to an FDA draft policy statement on industry involvement in 
continuing medical education was ripe for review even though the agency contended that it 
had not yet taken final action on the matter); United States v. Bioclinical Sys., Inc., 666 F. 
Supp. 82 (D. Md. 1987) (concluding that the FDA may not bypass the usual process for 
establishing a good manufacturing practice rule by unilaterally imposing the standard using a 
draft guideline). 
50. See Miller et aI., supra note 42, at 604 (arguing that, as with all clinical research, 
studies of the safety and efficacy of dietary supplements and other complementary therapies 
should adhere to rigorous scientific standards, including the use of placebo controls 
whenever appropriate). 
51. See, e.g., Tina Hesman, Ginseng May Help Prevent Diabetes, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
May 23, 2005, at E3; Judy Packer-Tursman, Pill "Very Promising": CoQJO May Arrest 
Parkinson's Disease, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2002, at F I (describing a study funded by a 
neurological disorders research institute and conducted by the coinventor of the product 
containing co-enzyme Q I 0, who acknowledges that he could gain financially from increased 
sales to Parkinson's patients); see also January W. Payne, What Really Works? Forget 
Hearsay, Here's How Science Sizes Up Some Therapies, WASH. POST, July 12,2005, at FI 
(reporting that "attempts to perform high-quality research [on a wide range of CAM] 
continue," and that "[s]ome of the biggest and best-designed trials are funded by the federal 
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increasingly pushed the envelope on permitted structure-or-function claims by 
attempting to prove that their products function in some quasi-therapeutic way. 
Because proof of efficacy strongly implies pharmacological activity, such 
findings should raise a red flag that the product may have attendant adverse 
effects. In other words, under this approach to risk identification, whenever 
supplement manufacturers attempt to substantiate their structure-or-function 
claims with scientific evidence, they unwittingly open the door to heightened 
regulatory scrutiny of potential health risks. 
B. The Risk Management Paradox 
Some dietary supplement products simply do not contain the type or 
quantity of the ingredients claimed on their labels and thus would be subject to 
charges of misbranding under OSHEA. 52 Some products, however, contain 
exactly the ingredients that they purport to contain-and may even do what 
they purport to do--but nonetheless can cause illness or injury when used 
according to instructions on the label. Under such circumstances, the FDA 
could pursue charges of product adulteration, but it would have to prove that 
the product "presents a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury 
under conditions recommended or suggested in the labeling," or that it poses 
"an imminent hazard to public health or safety."53 
government" through NCCAM, but adding that "[m]uch of the research on dietary 
supplements is marred by poor design and small sample size"). 
52. See 21 U.S.c. § 343(s) (providing that a dietary supplement is misbranded if its 
label fails to list the name and quantity of each ingredient in the product or if it fails to meet 
quality standards that its label represents it to meet). These products also can pose genuine 
safety issues, and the FDA's pending regulations dealing with good manufacturing practices 
(GMPs) should effectively address issues involving potency or contamination. See FDA, 
Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary 
Ingredients and Dietary Supplements, Part II, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,158 (proposed Mar. 13,2003) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F .R. pts. 111-12) (setting out minimum standards for quality control, 
testing products, and maintaining records); see also Robert B. Saper et aI., Heavy Metal 
Content ofAyurvedic Herbal Medicine Products, 292 lAMA 2868 (2004) (concluding that 
twenty percent of the sampled type of herbal product contained a contaminant such as lead, 
mercury, or arsenic, at levels sufficiently high to pose a risk of toxicity if ingested according 
to labeled dosing recommendations); Rob Stein, FDA Moves on Dietary Supplements, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2003, at Al (explaining that the proposed rules, like those for 
packaged foods, focus on maintaining quality and cleanliness and on setting out procedures 
for inspections and record-keeping). Ten years after DSHEA's enactment, the FDA has yet 
to finalize these GMP regulations. . 
53. 21 U.S.c. § 342(f)(1)(A), (C). The first portion of the safety standard, which 
assesses risk on the assumption that the product is being used according to label instructions, 
suggests that supplements that cause adverse effects only at higher-than-recommended doses 
would not be considered adulterated under the Act. The "imminent hazard" standard 
suggests, however, that the agency could still bring an adulteration charge if it has evidence 
that the product is routinely used at higher-than-recommended doses and results in harm at 
those doses. The FDA has used a similar statutory provision applicable to drugs, though on 
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Did Congress, by adopting the "significant or unreasonable risk" standard, 
simply increase the threshold of permissible risk for this sub-category of foods, 
or did it fundamentally alter the applicable standard by creating a risk-benefit 
balancing approach? Some observers might argue that the process of balancing 
risk against benefit is inherent in the concept of safety,54 In evaluating food 
safety, however, the FDA generally deems the potential benefits of a product to 
be irrelevant.55 OSHEA does not explicitly demand risk-benefit balancing and 
there is no reference in the statute to "benefit," though the word "unreasonable" 
is ambiguous and certainly could be interpreted to invite risk-benefit balancing. 
The "official" legislative history that accompanies the statute provides no 
enlightenment on this question. 56 
To date, the FDA has utilized OSHEA's provisions formally only once to 
declare a supplement product adulterated, when it promulgated a rule designed 
to prohibit the sale of herbal dietary supplement products containing ephedrine 
alkaloids.57 Between 1996 and 2003, several individuals died after ingesting 
only one occasion and that was three decades ago. See Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the 
Drug Approval Process?: Mijepristone Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE 
FORESTL. REv. 571, 592 & n.98 (2001). 
54. See FDA, General Recognition of Safety and Prior Sanctions for Food Ingredients, 
41 Fed. Reg. 53,600, 53,601 (Dec. 7, 1976) ("The ordinary understanding of the term 'safe' 
would require some benefit-to-risk analysis in such circumstances."); cf Noah & Merrill, 
supra note 14, at 392-95 (discussing the role that a food additive's benefits should play in 
assessing its safety). The FDA used this argument, among others, to justify its decision to 
engage in a risk-benefit calculus in evaluating the safety of ephedra supplements. See infra 
notes 67-91 and accompanying text. 
55. See Richard A. Merrill, Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the Food and Drug 
Administration, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 994, 998-99 (1977) (explaining, however, that due 
to limitations of food safety testing, even food ingredients deemed to be "safe" may pose 
some risk); Noah & Merrill, supra note 14, at 418-19 (describing the FDA's refusal to 
consider possible social benefits of reducing dietary fat during the safety evaluation of the 
food additive olestra). 
56. DSHEA is accompanied by a very brief statement of agreement that explains that 
no Senate or House report was submitted with the legislation and that the "statement of 
agreement comprises the entire legislative history for [DSHEA and that] it is the intent of the 
chief sponsors of the bill ... that no other reports or statements be considered as legislative 
history." 140 CONGo REc. S14,798 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of Rep. Feingold). 
The statement of agreement fills less than half a page and contains nothing directly relevant 
to the arguments presented in this Article. The rest of the legislative history, including a 
Senate report that was excluded under the statement of agreement, also provides virtually no 
guidance on the interpretation and application of DSHEA's adulteration standard. See S. 
REp. No. 103-410 (1994). 
57. See Reilley Michelle Dunne, Note, How Much Regulation Can We Swallow? The 
Ban on Ephedra and How It May Affect Your Access to Dietary Supplements, 31 J. LEGIS. 
351 (2005). With respect to all other products that the FDA has concluded are adulterated 
under DSHEA, the agency has opted to issue warning letters expressing concerns about 
adulteration to sellers of particular products thought to present unreasonable risks. For 
example, the agency contacted the manufacturers of a plantain supplement that was 
contaminated with toxic levels of digitalis, which resulted in a voluntary recall. See Nancy 
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ephedra-containing products. 58 Problems with the product surfaced much 
earlier, however. Beginning in 1994, the FDA issued a series of medical 
bulletins and consumer alerts warning of the risk of adverse effects from 
ephedra supplements.59 As early as 1996, a majority of the members of the 
agency's Food Safety Advisory Committee concluded that, because there was 
apparently no safe level for ephedra, all products containing the substance 
should be withdrawn from the market.60 As of 1997, the FDA had received 
over 800 adverse event reports concerning ephedra and estimates suggest that 
this ingredient played a role in at least 155 deaths.61 Based on these 
developments, the agency concluded that such supplements met the statutory 
standard for presenting a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury.62 
After initially proposing to address these safety concerns with restrictions on 
R. Slifinan et aI., Contamination ofBotanical Dietary Supplements by Digitalis Lanata, 339 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 806, 807 (1998) (describing two cases of serious side effects associated 
with the use of this contaminated product, including persistent nausea, vomiting, irregular 
heartbeat, shortness of breath, and palpitations); see also HHS, Andro Press Release, supra 
note 17, at 2 (announcing that the FDA issued warning letters to twenty-three companies 
asking them to cease distribution of products containing androstenedione, which cause 
testicular atrophy and impotence in men, increase the risk of various cancers in women, and 
increase the risk of blood clots in both sexes); Gilhooley, supra note 4, at 677-78 (discussing 
problems with the amino acid supplement L-tryptophan, which caused thirty-eight deaths 
from eosinophilia-myalgia syndrome); Gillis, supra note 2, at Al (describing a "prostate 
health" supplement that was contaminated with prescription anti-inflammatory, estrogen, 
and blood thinning drugs, which apparently injured or killed thirty-five people). 
58. In 1996, a twenty-year-old college student died after taking an "herbal ecstasy" 
product containing ephedra. See Schwartz, supra note II, at A2. In 1999, a twenty-one­
year-old man died during exercise while taking an ephedra product. See Guy Gugliotta, 
Lawsuits Show Big Increase: Stimulant's Critics Try New Forum, WASH. POST, July 23, 
2000, at Al (noting that a lawsuit involving the twenty-year-old college student's death 
settled for $2.5 million, that thirty-three other lawsuits involving ephedra side effects settled 
between 1994 and 2000, and that another forty-two cases were pending at the time). Finally, 
in 2003, twenty-three-year-old Baltimore Orioles pitcher Steve Bechler died after collapsing 
during spring training; he too had been taking an ephedra-based weight loss product. See 
George Vecsey, Baseball Has Failed to Confront Drugs, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 19,2003, at DI; 
see also As Backlash Against Ephedra Mounts, Congress Drags Feet, USA TODAY, July 17, 
2003, at AI2 (listing several other deaths apparently related to ephedra use). 
59. Ephedra can cause irregular heartbeat, sleeplessness, anxiety, tremors, headache, 
seizures, heart attack, and stroke. See GAO EPHEDRINE REpORT, supra note 25, at 5. 
60. See id. at 6. 
61. Schwartz, supra note II, at A2 (explaining that the FDA received over 800 adverse 
event reports between 1994 and 1997 concerning ephedra-containing products); see also 
Hampton, supra note 24, at 28 (noting that critics argue that the FDA waited too long to act, 
promulgating the final rule only after reports of at least 155 deaths associated with the use of 
ephedra). 
62. See GAO EPHEDRINE REpORT, supra note 25, at 5; see also Marcus & Grollman, 
supra note 33, at 2074 (describing the risks and adverse events associated with ephedra 
supplements). 
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dosage and recommended duration ofuse,63 the FDA ultimately concluded that 
only a complete ban on ephedra supplements would suffice to protect 
consumers.64 Seven years after the initial safety concerns arose, in February 
2004, the agency issued a final rule that declared ephedra products adulterated 
and required all sales of products containing ephedrine alkaloids to cease 
within sixty days.65 
The FDA's explanation of how it interpreted and applied DSHEA's 
adulteration provision raises some interesting regulatory possibilities. In the 
preamble to the final rule declaring ephedra supplements adulterated, the 
agency began by repeating that the statute requires evidence of "significant or 
unreasonable risk" of illness or injury, adding that "[t]here is no requirement 
that there be evidence proving that the product has caused actual harm to 
specific individuals, only that scientific evidence supports the evidence of 
risk."66 After reviewing its previous actions taken with respect to dietary 
supplements containing ephedrine alkaloids, the FDA explained that its final 
63. See FDA, Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids, Part II, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 30,678 (proposed June 4, 1997) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. Ill) (designating 
dietary supplements containing ephedra as adulterated if they contain more than 8 mg. of 
ephedrine alkaloids or if the product's label suggests dosing that would result in an intake of 
more than 8 mg. in a six-hour period or more than 24 mg. in twenty-four hours, and 
requiring warnings against use of the product for more than seven days or in combination 
with any other stimulant). The GAO criticized the proposal on the grounds that the available 
scientific evidence failed to support the proposed dosage guidelines. The FDA relied 
exclusively on adverse event reports (AERs) to develop the proposed dosing guidelines. The 
GAO observed that the "inherent weakness" of information from AERs, particularly the 
inconsistency in the type of data provided from one report to the next and the lack of proof 
of causality, rendered the FDA's dosing guidelines suspect. See GAO EPHEDRINE REpORT, 
supra note 25, at 9-11. Partly in response to the GAO report, the agency issued a revised 
proposal, partially withdrawing its earlier notice. See FDA, Dietary Supplements Containing 
Ephedrine Alkaloids; Withdrawal in Part, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,474 (proposed Apr. 3, 2000) (to 
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. Ill). 
64. Additional evidence of ephedrine's dangers continued to accumulate. One recent 
meta-analysis of published and unpublished trials of ephedra products found that such 
products create a 2.2- to 3.6-fold increased risk ofpsychiatric, autonomic, gastrointestinal, or 
coronary symptoms, including two deaths, three myocardial infarctions, nine strokes, and 
three seizures. See Paul Shekelle et ai., Efficacy and Safety ofEphedra and Ephedrine for 
Weight Loss and Athletic Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 289 JAMA 1537, 1543-44 (2003); 
see also In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 393 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (admitting 
some of the expert testimony offered by plaintiffs). 
65. See FDA, Final Rule, Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine 
Alkaloids Adulterated Because They Present an Unreasonable Risk, Part III, 69 Fed. Reg. 
6788 (Feb. 11,2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 119) [hereinafter FDA, Final Rule]. 
66. /d. at 6788; see also id. at 6822 (explaining that it may consider any relevant 
evidence, including scientific data about the toxicity of the product, clinical studies, and 
adverse events). The agency's position that the statute requires no evidence ofactual harm to 
individuals in order to proceed with an adulteration charge, if correct, is crucial to the 
alternative approach proposed herein because it would appear to open the door to 
extrapolation from animal studies to predict risk to humans. 
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rule relies exclusively on its authority under the "unreasonable" risk standard 
and announced that the regulation would not even address the meaning of the 
separate term "significant" in the adulteration provision.67 The agency then 
concluded that its burden of proving an "unreasonable risk" is met "when a 
product's risks outweigh its benefits in light of the claims and directions for use 
in the product's labeling or, if the labeling is silent, under ordinary conditions 
ofuse."68 
Turning to the FDA's application of the DSHEA adulteration provisions, 
the agency began its risk-benefit assessment by providing a detailed evaluation 
of the risks of products containing ephedrine compared with their benefits. The 
preamble focused on the "known and reasonably likely benefits" of ephedra 
supplements, while specifically excluding consideration of "speculative" 
benefits.69 While acknowledging that ephedra supplements appear to promote 
short-term weight loss, the FDA questioned whether these products promote 
the long-term weight loss necessary to provide measurable health benefits.70 
67. See id. at 6794. Interestingly, at the start of its analysis, the agency also appears to 
accept without comment the idea that, because DSHEA explicitly excludes supplement 
products from regulation as food additives, all other conventional food safety standards also 
do not apply. In fact, the FDA expressly disclaimed the applicability of food safety 
standards. The agency "agree [ d] that the [conventional food safety standards, i.e., the 
generally recognized as safe (GRAS) standard or the standard for FDA approval as a food 
additive] do not apply to dietary [supplement] ingredients." !d. at 6794-95. As explained 
above, DSHEA explicitly exempts dietary supplements from food additive requirements, but 
it is silent on the applicability of safety standards used for whole foods. Thus, the FDA's 
evaluation of ephedra products under DSHEA's "unreasonable risk" standard proceeds 
without reference to food safety standards, despite the fact that supplements are regulated as 
a special category of foods. 
68. !d. at 6822. The FDA disagreed with a comment that risk-benefit analysis is not a 
permissible agency interpretation of the statute. The comment argued that the agency had 
never before used risk-benefit balancing in evaluating the safety of foods and that nothing in 
the legislative history of DSHEA suggests that Congress intended the agency to adopt a risk­
benefit calculus. The comment suggested that the agency should evaluate the question of 
unreasonable risk without reference to the benefits of the product. In defending its decision 
to engage in a risk-benefit analysis, the FDA explored various arguments supporting its 
approach. See id. at 6822-23 ("An interpretation of unreasonable risk as entailing a 
balancing of the risks and benefits of the product is also consistent with the interpretation of 
other similar statutory provisions outside the [A]ct .... Indeed, it is difficult to construct an 
alternative formulation for the phrase 'unreasonable risk. '''). The FDA previously had 
announced its intention to evaluate supplement safety using risk-benefit analysis. See FDA, 
Final Rule, Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect 
of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, Part IV, 65 Fed. Reg. 1000 (Jan. 6, 
2000) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). 
69. See FDA, Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 6798 (defining a reasonably likely benefit as 
"one that is supported by a meaningful totality of the evidence, given the current state of 
scientific knowledge, though the evidence need not necessarily meet the approval standard 
for a prescription drug"). 
70. See id. at 6818-21 (discussing placebo-controlled trials that provide evidence that 
ephedrine promotes weight loss of approximately two pounds per month, but pointing out 
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The preamble also discussed the benefits of enhanced athletic performance, 
eased breathing, and improved alertness, finding insufficient data to support 
either of the first two claims and discounting the latter as a benefit to health'?) 
Ultimately, after a detailed review of the available scientific evidence and 
relevant adverse events,n the agency concluded that ephedrine-containing 
products have a negative risk-benefit profile and declared all such products 
adulterated under DSHEA's unreasonable risk standard.?3 
Because dietary supplements represent a category of food, and because the 
traditional food safety standard does not countenance risk-benefit balancing, 
the FDA could have taken the position that supplement manufacturers should 
not be permitted to offer claims of prospective benefit to offset associated risks. 
Instead, in interpreting the unreasonable risk standard, the FDA concluded that 
the plain meaning of the statutory language compels it to engage in a risk­
benefit calculus.74 It further defended this interpretation by explaining that the 
concept of unreasonableness in tort law entails a balancing test,75 and that the 
that only long-term weight loss is proven to provide health benefits). The FDA has become 
more accepting of the therapeutic value of drugs that reduce obesity. See Rob Stein, Is 
Obesity a Disease? Insurance, Drug Access May Hinge on the Answer, WASH. POST, Nov. 
10, 2003, at Al (explaining that the FDA is considering how to evaluate new weight-loss 
drugs, particularly "whether it should evaluate diet drugs more like it assesses treatments for 
such illnesses as diabetes and cardiovascular disease, which could help get new medications 
on the market more quickly by making it easier to get them approved"); see also Lars Noah, 
Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 261­
63 (1999) (explaining that the FDA's risk-benefit calculation depends on "the perceived 
importance of the therapeutic benefit," and discussing the disease status of obesity and risk­
benefit assessment of potential therapeutic approaches in this context). 
71. See FDA, Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 6821-22 (noting that, with respect to the 
eased breathing claim, "because healthy people are able to breathe without difficulty," there 
is "no respiratory benefit in the absence of a disease state," and that "claims to treat or 
mitigate a disease ... subject a product to regulation as a drug under the [Alct"). 
n. See id. at 6800-18 (delineating the scientific evidence of risk associated with 
ephedra supplement products, and discussing reported adverse events). 
73. See id. at 6793-94; see also 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(I)(A). The final rule declaring 
ephedrine-containing products adulterated excludes ephedra dispensed in a nonsupplement 
form as part of the practice of traditional herbal medicine, though it acknowledges the 
possibility of adverse events in the context of herbal medicine use. See FDA, Final Rule, 69 
Fed. Reg. at 6814 ("This rule applies only to products marketed as dietary supplements .... 
We note that the potential for adverse effects resulting from the traditional Asian use of 
Ephedra is implied in several reference texts that list precautions and 
contraindications ...."). The rule also explicitly excludes nonprescription drug products 
containing ephedrine alkaloids. See id. at 6793. 
74. See FDA, Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 6823 ("The plain meaning of 
'unreasonable' ... connotes comparison of the risks and benefits ofthe product."). 
75. This is hardly a well-settled point. For example, consider the debate in design 
defect litigation between a consumer expectations test and risk-utility balancing. See, e.g., 
Hansen v. Baxter HealthCare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35 (Ill. 2002) (refusing to abandon the 
consumer expectations test); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 
2001) (same); see also NOAH & NOAH, supra note 36, at 506-07 (noting the persistence of 
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term "unreasonable risk" as used in other provisions of the FDCA likewise 
contemplates a balancing of the risks of illness or injury against the product's 
benefits,?6 Finally, to the extent that Congress failed to speak clearly on the 
issue, the agency was quick to assert that its interpretation of the unreasonable 
risk standard would be entitled to judicial deference. 77 
Curiously, the preamble to the final rule also provides no explanation for 
why the agency opted to focus on the "unreasonable" risk portion of the 
adulteration standard rather than on "significant" risk in the course of declaring 
ephedra-containing products adulterated. Instead of utilizing a complex risk­
benefit balancing approach, the FDA simply could have reached a conclusion 
that ephedra supplement products pose a "significant" risk and are therefore 
adulterated within the meaning of DSHEA. As the agency observes, the 
concept of "[s]ignificant involves an evaluation of risk alone,"78 and it 
certainly seems that evaluating ephedrine-containing supplements under a 
significant risk standard would have presented a more straightforward task. 
Ephedra's risks are not theoretical; the FDA cited a wealth of scientific data to 
demonstrate the product's safety problems, which must surely meet the 
"significant" risk threshold. (If ephedra does not present a significant risk, then 
it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which any product would ever 
lose under that standard.) And, as explained above, the agency had little 
the "warranty-inspired conswner expectations test" for judging design defect claims and the 
more recent but at times grudging shift to a risk-utility balancing approach). In any event, 
concepts of unreasonableness in common law may not be relevant for purposes of construing 
a federal statute. 
76. See FDA, Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 6823 (discussing the legislative history of the 
medical device provisions of the FDCA). 
77. See id. at 6822-23 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984), and Chevron v. FERC, 193 F. Supp. 2d 54, 67 (D.D.C. 2002)). In the case of the 
ephedra final rule, the FDA is arguing that, if there is any doubt about the meaning of the 
term "unreasonable risk," Chevron principles would require a reviewing court to defer to the 
agency's interpretation of the term as requiring risk-benefit balancing. Cf Lars Noah, 
Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a "Legislative History" of Agency Rules, 51 
HASTINGS L.J. 255, 305-06 & n.193 (2000) ("[R]egulatory officials [are] busy cloaking 
themselves in that safe haven from the outset of a rulemaking or other proceeding, instead of 
attempting to offer persuasive explanations defending the reasonableness of their preferred 
interpretations and then only later, in defending against a judicial challenge, invoking 
Chevron as a kicker."). 
78. See FDA, Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 6823. One explanation, based on decisional 
law interpreting other regulatory statutes, is that the term calls for a cost-benefit analysis­
namely, weighing the economic dislocations caused by regulation against the risks to health 
avoided thereby. See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 407, 437 (1990). Undoubtedly, in threatening to destroy a tremendously lucrative 
business, the FDA's ephedra rule would have imposed large costs and secured benefits that 
it had difficulty quantifying. Indeed, any benefits might evaporate to the extent that 
consumers turn to substitutes posing similar risks. See Christine A. Haller et aI., 
Hemodynamic Effects of Ephedra-Free Weight-Loss Supplements in Humans, 118 AM. J. 
MED. 998 (2005). 
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difficulty concluding that the product's risks do not justify its minimal benefits. 
In part, the agency may have recognized that its limited evidence of risks 
associated with low-dose products might not qualify as "significant," coupled 
with the fact that it could summarily dismiss the purported benefits, even if 
substantiated. Perhaps the agency also adopted this approach in order to 
strengthen its position in future regulatory battles over other supplement 
products. After concluding that ephedra supplements present an unreasonable 
risk, the FDA's discussion elaborated further on the meaning of DSHEA's 
adulteration standard: "A risk could be significant but reasonable if the benefits 
were great enough to outweigh the risks."79 What did the FDA mean by this 
sentence? Was it a backhanded way of saying that a supplement's risk could be 
reasonable from a risk-benefit standpoint but remain "significant" and, 
therefore, still adulterated? 
The adulteration standard in DSHEA requires the FDA to demonstrate a 
"significant or unreasonable risk." Only if one interprets the two risk standards 
together with an "and" instead of an "or" can a pharmacologically active (and 
presumably risky) dietary supplement with therapeutic significance survive the 
adulteration inquiry under DSHEA. When products pose significant risks but 
also offer countervailing therapeutic benefits, the FDA will approve them as 
"drugs" if they satisfy a relative safety standard.80 Thus, balancing of risks and 
benefits is fundamental to the process of evaluating a new drug, and the agency 
may opt to tolerate very serious risks if the product offers a novel and 
important benefit. 81 
DSHEA's adulteration provision, however, refers to a "significant or 
unreasonable" risk. Principles of statutory construction, as elaborated in the 
case law, explain the consequences of selecting this disjunctive form in drafting 
legislation. Courts generally have interpreted the word "or" to mean that the 
terms it connects should have separate meanings and should be read 
79. FDA, Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 6823. 
80. See Wendy K. Mariner, Equitable Access to Biomedical Advances: Getting Beyond 
the Rights Impasse, 21 CONN. L. REv. 571, 595 (1989) ("Generally, [the FDA] must decide 
that something is safe and effective enough by balancing the nature and degree of risks 
against the benefit to be gained from reasonably effective products."). When the FDA 
evaluates a new drug seeking marketing permission, the agency must consider whether the 
product is "safe for use" and "effective for use." See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b). With respect to 
over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, which most closely resemble dietary supplements because 
they are used without physician supervision, the standards of safety and efficacy are even 
more conservative. See Lars Noah, Treat Yourself: Is Self-Medication the Prescription for 
What Ails American Health Care?, 19 flARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming May 2006). 
81. See Mariner, supra note 80, at 595-97; Robert M. Temple, Commentary on "The 
Architecture ofGovernment Regulation ofMedical Products," 82 VA. L. REv. 1877, 1887­
88 (1996); Denise Grady, Calculating Safety in Risky World ofDrugs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 
2001, at Fl; see also Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. La.), ajJ'd 
mem., 864 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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independently.82 OSHEA's enactment history further supports this 
interpretation. The predecessor bills introduced in both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives used the word "and" rather than "or" in the 
adulteration provision.83 This language remained unchanged in the bill that 
ultimately passed in the Senate and became the basis for the final legislation.84 
The version of the Senate bill that the House passed, however, substituted the 
word "or" in this provision.85 Even if no explanation accompanies particular 
alterations in the text of a bill as it winds its way through Congress, courts 
assume that such drafting changes have meaning.86 Thus, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that Congress made a conscious decision to use a disjunctive form 
in OSHEA's adulteration provision, and it would run contrary to that intent 
now to interpret the word "or" as "and" instead. 
In adopting this bifurcated interpretation of OSHEA's adulteration 
standard, the FDA has created a potentially powerful enforcement tool for 
future cases. In effect, the agency's reading of this statutory provision suggests, 
first, that unreasonable risk arises whenever an utterly useless dietary 
supplement poses anything more than a de minimis risk. As the FDA explained 
in its preamble to the final rule, "[i]n the absence of a sufficient benefit, the 
presence of even a relatively small risk of an important adverse health effect to 
a user may be unreasonable."87 Second, although the FDA specifically 
82. See IA NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 21.14 (6th ed. 2002); see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,339 
(1979) (explaining that canons of construction ordinarily require that words in a statute 
separated by the disjunctive "or" be given separate meanings and are not intended to modify 
each other); In re Cager, 248 A.2d 384, 393-94 (Md. 1968) (Barnes, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that the use of the disjunctive to separate different statutory criteria reflects 
legislative intent that they be read in the alternative). 
83. See S. 784, 103d Congo § 4 (1993); H.R. 1709, 103d Congo § 3(a) (1993). 
84. See 140 CONGo REc. HII,173, Hll,176 (daily ed. Oct. 6,1994); see also S. REp. 
No. 103-410, at 35 (1994): 
85. See 140 CONGo REc. SI4,798, S14,799 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994). 
86. See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization ofLegislative History in the Supreme 
Court, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 205, 232 ("With the exception of the textualist purists, the whole 
Court. .. now readily relies on drafting history and conference reports as guides to 
Congress's intent."); id. at 234 ("[E]ven some of the heartiest skeptics of legislative history 
generally recognize drafting history as hard to resist."). 
87. See FDA, Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 6788. For example, clinical trials of 
echinacea, which is widely used for the treatment of upper respiratory tract infections 
(URls), have demonstrated that, at best, this popular herb is a waste of money and, at worst, 
those who ingest it face an increased risk of skin reaction. In a clinical trial of this remedy in 
children, researchers found no difference between echinacea and placebo in either the 
duration or severity of URIs, but they did find a measurably increased incidence of skin rash 
in the echinacea group. See James A. Taylor et al., Efficacy and Safety of Echinacea in 
Treating Upper Respiratory Tract Infections in Children, 290 JAMA 2924 (2003). For 
another example of a type of supplement that appears to provide no benefit while arguably 
increasing (at least slightly) the risk of harm, see January W. Payne, Antioxidant Pills 
Questioned. Again, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at F I (describing a meta-analysis of several 
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disclaims any intent to address the meaning of "significant risk,"88 it did 
suggest that this standard attaches when a potentially useful supplement poses a 
serious risk, even in the event that the product's benefits arguably outweigh its 
risks. In other words, a product that poses a significant but reasonable risk 
would still be adulterated under the statute. Conversely, a product's risk could 
be insignificant but also unreasonable if its benefits are minor or nonexistent, 
rendering that product unlawful as well. 
Thus, the FDA's decision to employ risk-benefit balancing in applying the 
adulteration standard may serve its purposes very handily. Although some 
products might in fact survive the bifurcated inquiry (i.e., their benefits 
outweigh their insignificant risks), 89 in cases where a product poses a 
significant risk or provides little benefit to justify a more than minimal risk, the 
FDA can find such a product adulterated. Taken together, this approach 
amounts to a "heads I win; tails you lose" strategy for the FDA.90 In the first 
judicial challenge to the ephedra rule, however, a federal judge rejected the 
FDA's interpretation and concluded that the agency failed to prove any risk 
with low-dose ephedra products (i.e., less than ten mg. ephedrine alkaloid per 
day).9J 
studies evaluating the supposed cancer prevention properties of antioxidant supplements that 
concludes that such products may not prevent cancer and may in fact increase the risk of 
death). 
88. See FDA, Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 6794. 
89. For example, studies suggest that glucosamine supplementation provides some 
pain relief and improved function for people who suffer from chronic knee pain, and there is 
no evidence of significant associated adverse effects with this product. See R. Braham et aI., 
The Effect ofGlucosamine Supplementation on People Experiencing Regular Knee Pain, 37 
BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 45, 45-47 (2003) (describing a clinical trial in which 88% of those 
subjects receiving glucosamine reported some improvement in their knee pain over the 
treatment period compared with 17% in the placebo group). 
90. The agency has tried a similar "squeeze play" in other contexts, with some success. 
See PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 401 (2d ed. 1991); David A. Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human 
Drugs for Nonapproved Uses Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 693, 741-43 (1978) (discussing this tactic). For example, one court upheld the FDA's 
determination that a drug was misbranded for failing to contain adequate directions for use 
because its label lacked information about the condition that the drug was intended to treat. 
See Alberty Food Prods. Co. v. United States, 185 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1950). If, however, the 
manufacturer had attempted to satisfy the adequate directions for use requirement, the FDA 
instead could have claimed that the product was misbranded because its label contained 
information about an unapproved new drug use. For additional examples of the squeeze 
play, see V.E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1957); United States 
v. Hohensee, 243 F.2d 367, 370-71 (3rd Cir. 1957). 
91. See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Crawford, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (D. Utah 2005). 
Although it failed to explain how best to construe the free-standing term "unreasonable," the 
court held that "[t]he plain language of the DSHEA does not require a comparison of 
benefits and risks." [d. at 1318; see also id. ("[T]he legislative history of the DSHEA 
indicates that Congress generally intended to harmonize the treatment of dietary 
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If, as seems likely, an appellate court ultimately endorses the FDA's 
approach to ephedra, then the next supplement manufacturer that faces an 
adulteration charge will try to argue that its purported risks are "reasonable" 
because the product's benefits outweigh its risks. The FDA then could choose 
to focus on the "significant risk" prong of the standard and claim that, whatever 
the product's benefits, it carries significant risks. In fact, the FDA could 
identify those supplements that probably could satisfy new drug approval 
scrutiny and find them adulterated under the "significant risk" standard. If 
supplement manufacturers manage to substantiate their permitted structure-or­
function claims, then they avoid the risk of a misbranding charge because the 
label is accurate, but, if it also serves as a signal of potentially hazardous 
pharmacological activity (as suggested previously), then, in a perverse fashion, 
persuasive evidence of efficacy could lead to an adulteration charge under the 
"significant risk" provision, while leaving the manufacturer unable to defend 
itself on the basis of the product's usefulness. If ensnared by this "Catch-22," 
the manufacturer would retain the option of submitting an application for new 
drug approval to the FDA after first undertaking clinical trials to demonstrate 
its product's safety and efficacy. Of course, this avenue is precisely what 
dietary supplement manufacturers sought to avoid when they lobbied Congress 
to enact OSHEA, but, at least to the extent that these companies want to make 
strong claims of utility for their products, the FDA should force them to satisfy 
new drug approval requirements when supplements pose genuine risks to go 
with the promise of real therapeutic benefit. 
supplements with that of foods when it added the dietary supplement subsection to the food 
adulteration provision."); id. at 1316 n.5 (noting that "it need not determine whether the 
FDA properly omitted the term 'significant' from its construction of the statute"). In 
particular, the court thought that the agency's interpretation had impermissibly shifted the 
burden of proof. See id. at 1319 ("The FDA's imposition of a risk-benefit analysis places a 
burden on the producers ... to demonstrate a benefit as a precondition to sale, and that is 
contrary to Congress' intent."). At least in the ephedra rulemaking, however, the FDA did 
no such thing-the agency never questioned the efficacy of ephedra in accomplishing those 
purposes claimed by proponents of the supplement; instead, it made an entirely defensible 
judgment that those endpoints lacked any genuine clinical utility that would counterbalance 
the associated risks. Cf E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 678, 683-85 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). In tandem with its decidedly undeferential approach to statutory construction, the 
court imposed a seemingly unrealistic burden of proof on the agency. See Nutraceutical 
Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1320 ("There is no specific data involving the oral ingestion of 10 
mg per day of [ephedrine alkaloid supplements)."); id. at 1321 ("The statement that a safe 
level cannot be determined is simply not sufficient to meet the government's burden."). The 
court remanded without vacating the final rule, and it enjoined enforcement actions against 
sellers of low-dose ephedra products, see id. at 1321, so the regulation remains in place and 
fully applicable to higher dose products. Another industry challenge is still pending. See 
NVE, Inc. v. HHS, 436 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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III. CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY AND REGULATORY STRATEGY 
The congressional findings accompanying DSHEA reflect a disdain for 
paternalism, instead (perhaps naively) trusting consumers to make sensible 
choices about the use of dietary supplements.92 The legislation explains that, 
because "consumers are placing increased reliance on the use of nontraditional 
health care providers to avoid the excessive costs of traditional medical 
services,"93 and because supplements are "safe within a broad range of 
intake,"94 "legislative action that protects the right of access of consumers to 
safe dietary ingredients is necessary in order to promote wellness."95 In short, 
Congress viewed dietary supplements as appropriate substitutes for traditional 
therapeutic products while implicitly criticizing the whole of traditional 
medicine. 
The problem of dietary supplement regulation raises some broader 
questions about the role of health care providers in the diffusion of these 
products into the market. Until recently, the medical profession was generally 
dismissive of unconventional treatments, preferring instead to utilize 
medications and therapies with proven efficacy and appropriate risk-benefit 
profiles for the target condition.96 Now, however, it appears that many 
physicians have climbed aboard the dietary supplement bandwagon,97 perhaps 
92. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(8) (2000) (explaining that "consumers should be empowered 
to make choices about preventive health care programs based on data from scientific studies 
of health benefits related to particular dietary supplements"); see also id. § 321 (2) 
(announcing that "the importance of nutrition and the benefits of dietary supplements to 
health promotion and disease prevention have been documented increasingly in scientific 
studies"). Of course, because DSHEA fails to provide much guidance on the nature of the 
required scientific documentation of benefits, these statements ring hollow. For a discussion 
of the role of "policy" or "purpose" sections in interpreting legislation, see Muriel Morisey 
Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism a Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 585, 600 n.76 
(1994). 
93. 21 U.S.C. § 321(10). 
94. /d. § 321(14). 
95. Id. § 321(15)(A). 
96. Physicians continue to express concern about the use of alternative therapies in lieu 
of evidence-based clinical treatments. See, e.g., Max J. Coppes et aI., Letter, Alternative 
Therapies for the Treatment of Childhood Cancer, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 846, 846-47 
(1998) (describing two cases in which parents refused standard treatment on behalf of their 
children and instead utilized alternative remedies, resulting in tumor progression in one case 
that required more toxic chemotherapy, and death in another case); Dana Canedy, Real 
Medicine or Medicine Show? Growth ofHerbal Remedies Sales Raises Issues About Value, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1998, at Dl (quoting former FDA Commissioner David Kessler who 
worries that people with potentially life-threatening diseases use these products in lieu of 
proven medical treatment); Matt McMillen, Light Touch in the Operating Room: What Is 
Rei/d, an Alternative Energy Therapy, Doing in a Mainstream Medical Institution?, WASH. 
POST, July 26, 2005, at Fl (discussing research conducted in hospitals and some of the 
continued skepticism of physicians). 
97. See John A. Astin et aI., A Review of the Incorporation of Complementary and 
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catering to growing consumer demand for complementary and alternative 
medicine (CAM).98 Physicians may embrace dietary supplements either out of 
a genuine belief in the usefulness of these products or because they do not want 
to miss out on a profit-making opportunity.99 This trend should trigger some 
genuine soul-searching on the part of medical professionals. 
When physicians support the therapeutic use of dietary supplements, they 
imply to their patients that the safety and efficacy of these products are well­
established. At a minimum, such recommendations may mislead patients, and 
in some instances may increase the actual risk of harm when patients forego 
Alternative Medicine by Mainstream Physicians, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2303, 2309 
(1998) (reviewing nineteen international physician surveys on CAM and concluding that 
approximately thirteen percent of physicians believe in the value of herbal approaches, fewer 
than those who believe in the value of 'chiropractic or massage therapy); Wayne Jonas, 
Alternative Medicine and the Conventional Practitioner, 279 JAMA 708, 708 (1998) 
(explaining that physicians must work to protect patients from untested therapies and 
supplement products, but suggesting that, when scientific evidence supports a supplement's 
efficacy, physicians can incorporate such products as part of disease treatment); D.K. Owen 
et al., Can Doctors Respond to Patients' Increasing Interest in Complementary and 
Alternative Medicine?, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 154, 154 (2001) (explaining that "doctors are 
responding to [patients' increased interest in alternative medicine] in several ways, from 
being enthusiastic and interested to mystified and critical" and noting that the British 
Medical Association's attitude toward alternative medicine has become increasingly 
positive). 
98. According to a study published more than a decade ago, one-third of Americans 
utilize some form of CAM. See David M. Eisenberg et al., Unconventional Medicine in the 
United States: Prevalence, Costs, and Patterns of Use, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 246, 246 
(1993); see also Harold J. Burstein et al., Use ofAlternative Medicine by Women with Early­
Stage Breast Cancer, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1733, 1733 (1999) (citing surveys that estimate 
that thirty to forty percent of Americans use alternative medicine in some form); Michael H. 
Cohen & Mary C. Ruggie, Integrating Complementary and Alternative Medical Therapies in 
Conventional Medical Settings: Legal Quandaries and Potential Policy Models, 72 U. ON. 
L. REv. 671, 676-83 (2003) (describing burgeoning consumer demand and trends in the 
integration of these therapies into conventional medical care). 
99. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFF., AM. MED. ASS'N, Sale of Health­
Related Products from Physicians' Offices, in AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § E-8.063, 
available at http://www.ama-assn.orglamalpub/category/8486.html (2005) (explaining that 
"[p]hysicians who choose to sell health-related products from their offices should not sell 
any health-related products whose claims of benefit lack scientific validity," and urging 
physicians to "limit sales to products that serve the immediate and pressing needs of their 
patients"); cf Council on Ethical & Judicial Aff., Am. Med. Ass'n, Sale of Non-Health­
Related Goods from Physicians' Offices, 280 JAMA 563 (1998) (describing a trend in sale 
of nonhealth related goods from physicians' offices, including household products and 
magazine subscriptions, and explaining that such practices pose a conflict of interest, create 
subtle sales pressure, and demean medical practice); Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REv. 603, 
614 (2003) (describing a similar trend with respect to the opening of highly profitable 
fertility clinics). 
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proven technologies in favor of "natural" remedies. 100 Physicians who sell or 
verbally endorse the use of unproven dietary supplements as part of their 
practice fail in their duty to refuse unwise patient requests. IOI Although the 
health care profession generally acknowledges that patients have an 
autonomous right to participate in health care decisionmaking, physicians 
retain the obligation to protect patients from harmful choices. 102 
Moreover, because consumers typically use supplements without any 
physician supervision, pharmacologically-active dietary supplements present 
serious risks without the ameliorating influence of expert oversight. Patients 
frequently fail to disclose their use of dietary supplements and other 
unconventional therapies to their physicians, thereby increasing the risk that 
physicians will prescribe drugs that may interact adversely with these 
products. 103 Surgical patients who use herbal products are particularly at risk 
100. Cf Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d 1060, 1063 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing and remanding 
a wrongful death judgment, involving a patient who chose unconventional therapies for her 
cancer instead of the recommended surgery, because the trial court had failed to instruct the 
jury on express assumption of risk); Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 994-96 (2d Cir. 
1987) (reversing and remanding the district court's judgment for a breast cancer patient who 
underwent unconventional treatment at the defendant physician's recommendation because 
the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on assumption of risk); Chare11 v. 
Gonzalez, 673 N'y.S.2d 685, 686-87 (App. Div. 1998) (considering comparative negligence 
of a patient who declined chemotherapy in favor of unorthodox treatment); David A. 
Studdert et aI., Medical Malpractice Implications ofAlternative Medicine, 280 JAMA 1610 
(1998). 
101. See James A. Bulen, Jr., Complementary and Alternative Medicine: Ethical and 
Legal Aspects of Informed Consent to Treatment, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 331 (2003); J. Brad 
Kallmyer, Note, A Chimera in Every Sense: Standard of Care for Physicians Practicing 
Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 225, 247, 257 (2005); id. 
at 225 ("Individual patient desires notwithstanding, the physician maintains a duty to abstain 
from unreasonable practices."); see also Allan S. Brett & Laurence B. McCullough, When 
Patients Request Specific Interventions: Defining the Limits of the Physician's Obligations, 
315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1347, 1349-50 (1986); Jerry Menikoff, Demanded Medical Care, 30 
ARIz. ST. L.J. 1091, 1116 (1998); Steven H. Miles, Informed Demandfor "Non-Beneficial" 
Medical Treatment, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 512, 513-14 (1991). Of course, physicians 
routinely depend on the use of unproven treatments. See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and 
the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 
361,362-63,377-408 (2002) (arguing that experimentation pervades medical practice). 
102. See De Smet, supra note 31, at 2054 ("Clinicians should not prescribe or 
recommend herbal remedies without well-established efficacy as if they were medications 
that had been proved effective by rigorous study .... They must tread a line between an 
apparently sympathetic stance that might be interpreted as an endorsement of unproven 
therapies and categorical disapproval, which would discourage patients from revealing their 
use of herbal remedies."). 
103. See David M. Eisenberg, Advising Patients Who Seek Alternative Medical 
Therapies, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 61, 66 (1997) (urging physicians to ask their 
patients specifically whether they utilize dietary supplements or other alternative medical 
therapies); David M. Eisenberg et aI., Perceptions About Complementary Therapies Relative 
to Conventional Therapies Among Adults Who Use Both and Non-Disclosure of 
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for adverse effects caused by such interactions because physicians may 
prescribe drugs prior to and after surgery, and physiologic changes resulting 
from surgery may impact drug and herb metabolism. 104 Even when a patient 
discloses the use of dietary supplements, the paucity of scientific data on 
supplement-drug interactions often will prevent the physician from making 
fully-informed prescribing decisions. 
More broadly, questions about appropriate dietary supplement regulation 
offer a microcosm of the debate over strategies for consumer product 
regulation. It has served as a flashpoint between political conservatives, who 
prefer to allow market forces to curb industry abuses, and liberals, who favor 
federal regulation in their zeal to protect consumers from making poor 
decisions. Of course, this statement oversimplifies a far more complex and 
subtle struggle about risk regulation of consumer products. 105 Moreover, 
hoping that professional self-regulation will serve as a decentralized substitute 
for direct regulation forgets that profit motivation and consumer demand may 
limit physicians' willingness to discourage inappropriate use. For these 
reasons, perhaps we should applaud the FDA's creative and expansive 
interpretations of DSHEA so as to maximize its ability to check the risks 
associated with these products. 
Complementary and Alternative Therapies: Results from a National Survey, 135 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 344 (2001); Donald D. Hensrud et aI., Underreporting the Use ofDietary 
Supplements and Nonprescription Medications Among Patients Undergoing a Periodic 
Health Examination, 74 MAyO CLINIC PROC. 443, 444-46 (1999) (explaining that patients 
frequently fail to report herbal medication use on written health history questionnaires and 
are more likely to reveal this information if questioned in person); Adam Lusher & Fiona 
Govan, Health Shop Cures Can Kill Patients, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), July 4, 2004, 
at 15 (reporting on a study that found that ninety percent of people in Britain who take 
herbal supplements do not inform their physicians of this fact or inquire about potential 
interactions with prescription drugs). 
104. See Michael K. Ang-Lee et aI., Herbal Medicines and Perioperative Care, 286 
JAMA 208, 209-14 (2001) (describing potential adverse effects from eight commonly used 
herbal medicines, including immunostimulation from echinacea, vasoconstriction and stroke 
from ephedra, anti-clotting effects from garlic, gingko biloba and ginseng, and prolonged 
anesthesia from kava and valerian, and recommending that physicians carefully question 
patients about herbal use prior to surgery); Tara Parker-Pope, Cancer and Vitamins: Patients 
Urged to Avoid Supplements During Treatment, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2005, at D 1. 
105. On the tension between paternalistic regulation and consumer freedom-of-choice 
in this field, see Kathleen M. Boozang, Western Medicine Opens the Door to Alternative 
Medicine, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 206-11 (1998); Randall G. Holcombe, Eliminating 
Scope ofPractice and Licensing Laws to Improve Health Care, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 236, 
243-44 (2003); Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" 
from the "Need to Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, II YALE J. ON REG. 293, 318 
& n.106, 397-98 (1994). For a particularly spirited and at times utterly perplexing 
endorsement of the right of consumers to make foolish choices, see Barbara L. Atwell, 
Mainstreaming Complementary and Alternative Medicine in the Face of Uncertainty, 72 
UMKC L. REv. 593 (2004). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
By recharacterizing dietary supplements as a category of foods, DSHEA 
codified an end-run around the premarket approval requirements applicable to 
food additives and drugs in order to give consumers freedom to use these 
largely unproven products. At the same time, the statute encourages 
therapeutic use by permitting labels with structure-or-function and health 
claims. Not surprisingly, dietary supplement manufacturers want the best of 
both worlds; they would like to market their products with thinly veiled 
therapeutic claims but free of the restrictions and premarket safety and efficacy 
evaluation that apply to drugs (and to food additives), then, when risks come to 
light, they would like to emphasize the purportedly offsetting benefits to justify 
continued marketing. The industry cannot have it both ways. First, the FDA 
should take the position that the most worrisome dietary supplements are the 
ones that actually work exactly as promised. OSHEA requires substantiation of 
claims, and many sellers eagerly try to prove their products' worth, but the 
stronger the evidence of utility, the more seriously the agency should express 
concerns about the possible attendant risk based on pharmacological activity. 
Second, the FDA has sought to construe the "unreasonable risk" prong of 
OSHEA's adulteration provision to require risk-benefit balancing in ways that 
usefully serve agency goals. Under the FDA's bifurcated approach to risk 
management, evidence of risk may provide the basis for an adulteration charge 
under the "substantial risk" part of the adulteration provision, while leaving the 
manufacturer unable to defend itself by offering evidence of the product's 
therapeutic benefits under the "unreasonable risk" portion of this provision. At 
the same time, the FDA may find other dietary supplements adulterated even if 
they do not present a significant risk, when such products provide little or no 
documented benefit to justify anything more than minimal risk. 
Since the enactment of DSHEA, the FDA has complained vocally that 
Congress has tied its hands, giving the agency only very limited authority to 
regulate dietary supplements. Two years ago, in the preamble to its final rule 
declaring ephedrine-containing products adulterated, the FDA seemed finally 
to have discovered the undoubtedly unintended possibilities embedded in 
OSHEA's adulteration provision. Unless the judiciary continues to show an 
uncharacteristic lack of deference to the agency's interpretation of this 
provision and scientific judgments, the ephedra rulemaking may have opened 
the door to an aggressive risk regulation strategy within the confines of the 
statute. One might even suspect that the FDA deliberately set up the industry 
for future "squeeze plays" through its construction of DSHEA' s adulteration 
provision. Meanwhile, the agency should examine the scientific literature for 
published studies evaluating the efficacy of dietary supplements and take a 
closer look at the safety of those that actually appear to perform as promised. 
Finally, if the FDA wants to make conscientious decisions about the utilization 
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of its limited resources, it largely should ignore those products that are merely 
ineffectual because the risk of physical injury to consumers of 
pharmacologically active dietary supplements far outweighs the agency's more 
typical preoccupation with rooting out economic fraud. 
